Professor Citino is quickly becoming one of my favorite military and operational historians. Dr. Citino is currently a fellow of the Barsanti Military History Center at the University of North Texas and is scheduled to be a visiting professor at the US Air Force Academy in 2011. He is arguably the foremost authority on German military thought and history today.
This volume is not a traditional narrative battle history. So be forewarned, if that's what you are looking for, you may not enjoy this book as much as I did. Dr. Citino has written a combination of operational analysis and cultural history of the German Wehrmacht in 1942, shedding light on why German generals made decisions and fought battles in the manner of Bewegungskrieg, or maneuver warfare. Drawing on his extensive knowledge of both German military history and his study of the operational level of warfare--that nebulous region between traditional strategy and tactics--Dr. Citino weaves a picture of a German General Staff stuck between a strategic rock and hard place in early 1942. The expected Russian blitzkrieg (a word he studiously avoids) did not crush the Soviet Union, and with the entry of the US into the war, the Germans really found themselves with limited strategic options to bring about a decisive conclusion before the Allies material superiority made itself felt on the battlefield.
Both in the North African desert and steppes of southern Russia, the Wehrmacht showed their forte for armored warfare, particularly the crushing of the British 8th Army at Gazala and the overrunning of the Red Army in the Caucasus. However, Citino also lays out the strategic shortcomings of German planning, making the devastating case that horrible decision making by Hitler and his OKW diluted German operational prowess by ignoring several traditional German maxims about waging war, especially the need for a Schwerpunkt or main focus of the military effort to bring about a decisive victory. Reading between the lines, one can infer from Citino's effort that Stalingrad was clearly a huge waste of resources by the Germans, and this Grouchy Historian can only wander if the Germans could have reached Baku with the 6th Army in the fight, instead of it being ultimately consumed in what became a battle of egos for a city named for a brutal dictator.
More importantly, for all their tactical genius, the Germans consistently ignored the old saw "Amateurs talk tactics, but professionals talk logistics." Not to say that commanders like Rommel or Manstein were amateurs, but German commanders were famous for ignoring logistical difficulties in favor of battlefield exploits brought about by shear force of will. But, again, as Dr. Citino lays out with devastating analysis, the lack of fuel and other supplies slowed down key German efforts and clearly contributed to Rommel's inability to conquer Egypt in summer 1942 and the inability of the 6th Army to capture Stalingrad in the early summer before it became a fortified city. He is unsparing in his analysis and criticism of how German generals pushed their mobile forces to the breaking point, with seemingly little regard for mundane matters like food, fuel and ammunition resupply. Ultimately, tactical genius could not overcome geography and logistics, and he ends the book with an account of how the British at El Alamein and the Russians at Stalingrad were able to defeat the Germans with the own brand of modern warfare--although each side defeated the Germans very differently.
If you have a decent understanding of the overall campaign history of 1942, this is a truly excellent book for understanding why the Wehrmacht fought the way it did, how it managed to inflict major defeats on larger opponents and ultimately why these battlefield victories could not achieve overall strategic success.
Dr. Citino's use of German language sources is truly mind-boggling, and it is easy to see how he intends to fit together a set of books on German military culture through World War II based on his previous work:
The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich (Modern War Studies)
and his new book...hot off the press and in my little hands:
The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War (Modern War Studies)
I highly, highly recommend this book for the serious reader of World War II history and look forward to sharing my views on the next volume.
Comments
Prussia, and before that the small Duchy of Brandenburg that became Prussia, was a small, impoverished realm on the outskirts of Europe surrounded by larger enemies such as Russia, Sweden and the Habsburg Empire, and slightly further away the strongest country in Europe at the time; France. And with no defensible borders. Prussia would always loose wars of attrition or defensive wars against these larger enemies and to fight one was a slow way of losing. Hence, Prussia would have to beat their enemies fast. Their wars needed to be “Kurz und Wieves” as Friederich himself put it. This required the Prussian army to outmaneuver its enemies with the goal of fighting a “Kesselschlact”; surrounding the enemy and hitting him from all sides with extreme violence- no starving him out as that took too long; surround and destroy. This cannot be achieved by defending, and, again quoting Friederich; “The most certain way of ensuring victory is to march briskly and in good order against the enemy, always endeavouring to gain ground” or “The Prussian Army always attacks- we would be foolish to give up the advantages of attacking; with well-trained infantry and bold and aggressive commanders”. And up to the very end of WW2, the Germans would have an offensive mindset; trying to defeat their enemies by attacking them rather than to bleed them dry and inevitably very swiftly counterattacking if forced out of a position. And always trying to achieve Bewegungskrieg where their superior training and leadership would outweigh their enemies’ numerical superiority: All the French, British and Soviet armies smashed by the Wehrmacht in 1940-41-42 were superior in numbers and tanks, they lost anyway. The Americans learned the hard way at Kasserine- the Brits had warned saying literally, “You got to beware when fighting the Germans… they are faster than you are used to when on exercises”. These front-loaded campaigns would aim to annihilate the enemy fast, and you had to learn fast while fighting them, for you often did not get a second chance- only the Soviets and Brits did, because they had places to hide and learn.
If you like to study German military thinking, you might want to also read Jörg Muth's "Command Culture". His and Citino's works are the two legs necessary to grasp it.
Best wishes